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Cordon pricing in the monocentric city model:
theory and application to Iˆle-de-France
Andre´ de Palma∗† Moez Kilani‡ Michel De Lara‡
Serge Piperno‡
December 10, 2008
Abstract
We propose a method to compute an equilibrium solution for the
monocentric city model with traffic congestion, and to quantify the im-
pact of cordon tolls on social surplus. The focus of this paper is on the
comparison of road pricing of one and two cordons, with the no toll and
first-best situations as benchmarks. We find that a one-cordon toll yields
a social efficiency of 63% with respect to first-best, and that an optimal
two-cordon toll increases the efficiency to 73%. Both policies have a pos-
itive impact on CO2 emissions because they reduce the average length of
trips and reduce the road size.
JEL code: R21; R41; R48
Keywords: Monocentric model; Cordon toll; Acceptability of road pricing
1 Introduction
From a transportation economics perspective, it is well established that con-
gestion pricing is necessary to adequately allocate the usage of transportation
infrastructure as an economic good. From a broader perspective of urban eco-
nomics, congestion pricing is required to correctly allocate land between housing
and transportation. Pricing removes market distortions introduced by trans-
portation externalities among users and induces an improvement in the social
welfare.
∗ENS Cachan and E´cole Polytechnique, 61 avenue du Pre´sident Wilson, Cachan 94230,
France.
†Corresponding author. Phone: +33 1 47 40 55 75. Fax: +33 1 47 40 24 60. Email:
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In the presence of a cordon toll, a driver pays a toll when he crosses the
cordon.1 When demand is inelastic (and fixed to home-to-work trips) the toll
paid by a household depends on where she/he lives and where she/he works. In
the monocentric city model, where all economic activites are located in the city
center, there are two types of households: Those who live outside the cordon
and pay the toll, and those who live inside the cordon and do not pay the toll.
Households outside the cordon typically enjoy larger housing area, due to smaller
competition on land. With two cordons there are three groups of households:
Those who live inside the two cordons and do not pay any toll; those who live
between the two cordons and pay a moderate toll; and those who live outside
the two cordons and pay a high toll. As we move away from the city center, the
households incur a larger generalized travel cost but occupy a larger area.
In recent years, an important literature on cordon tolls has emerged. Maru-
yama & Sumalee (2007) discuss equity issues and compare cordon and area-
based tolls. Cordon tolls are found to be better in terms of equity. De Palma
& Lindsey (2006) conduct a case study on Paris on the basis of a dynamic
simulation (Metropolis model). A discussion of cordon toll in Edinburgh with
smaller value than the socially optimal one is evaluated in Laird et al. (2007) on
the basis of the MARS model.2 Santos (2002) measures the impact of cordon
toll on travel cost for a set of cities in UK. The author compares single and
double cordon schemes and finds that the latter induces an appreciable gain
by comparison to the former. The scope of these studies remains limited to
short-term effects. Indeed, they do not take into account the impact of road
pricing on the urban form (the origin/destination pair remains unchanged, for
all travellers, before and after pricing is implemented).
Cordon tolls have been discussed under the framework of the monocentric
city model in Mun et al. (2003) and Verhoef (2005), who found that cordon
tolls reach a relatively high efficiency level. Both papers, however, consider a
restrictive versions of the monocentric city model. In particular, the trade-off
between land devoted to housing and land devoted to transportation has not
been considered (the land allocated to transport is fixed). Safirova et al. (2005)
uses a numerical model to evaluate the impact of cordon tolls for California.
This paper considers this trade-off and compares first-best and cordon tolls. A
simple area-based toll has been implemented in London3 and related reports
(cf. Santos & Fraser 2006, Leape 2006) show that it yields benefits, both on
the level of congestion and on the level of emissions, even if the environmental
objective has not been mentioned at the implementation stage of the project.
Extensions of this experience are being under consideration and the need to
better understand the positive and the negative impacts of multiple cordon is
urgent (cf. Transport for London 2006). This is precisely the scope of this paper.
We extend De Lara et al. (2008), henceforth DDKP, by adding a two-cordon
regime and compare with the no-toll, one cordon and first-best regimes. In
1By contrast, with a zone toll drivers pay the toll as they drive inside the zone.
2This issue has been motivated by a referendum in which the cordon toll project for the
city of Edinburgh has been rejected.
3The so-called “London congestion charge”.
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DDKP, the linear toll has been characterized by a high level of efficiency (93%)
with respect to the first-best toll. A linear toll is proportional to travel dis-
tance, and can be implemented as gasoline tax. But, to reach an acceptable
level of efficiency, an excessive level of toll is required (about five times higher
than the actual vehicle operating cost). Under the present situation it seems
difficult to convince road users by an additional (and systematic) increase in
energy cost. Decision makers do not seem to consider this issue seriously. Cor-
don tolls have the advantage to depend on the trip characteristics, namely the
origin/destination pair. In this sense, they are proposed as tools that control
at the same time fuel consumption and congestion. Positive echos from the
experience of London may contribute to facilitate acceptability of cordon tolls
among other European capital cities.
We wish to provide answers to the following question: What is the benefit
of a two-cordon toll by comparison to a one-cordon toll? Indeed, an optimal
urban form implies smaller city and higher concentration of households around
the Central Business District (CBD) (cf. Kanemoto 1977, Pines & Sadka 1985,
De Lara et al. 2008). With one cordon we reach an efficiency level of 63%, and
intuition suggests that with two cordons it is easier to address both objectives
(reduce urban sprawl and increase housholds’ density near the city center) more
accurately. Theoretically, first-best toll may be (arbitrarily close) approximated
by a sequence of cordon tolls covering the urban area. In practice, decision
makers are generally interested in simple schemes involving one or two-cordon
tolls.
To implement the two-cordon toll, we first extend the solution approach pro-
posed in DDKP and search for the optimal locations and values of the tolls. Let
us call “first cordon” the outer cordon and “second cordon” the inner cordon.4
We find that in Iˆle-de-France (IDF) it is optimal to set the first and second
cordons at distances of 31km and 14km from the city center, respectively. Op-
timal toll levels are 16e at the first toll and 13e at the second cordon. With
this pricing rule, we reach an efficiency of 73%. So, the marginal benefit of
the second cordon with respect to the first cordon is 10%. Concerning CO2
emissions, which is assumed here to be proportional to the travel distance, it
involves a decrease of only 3%. For the two cordon scheme, the city becomes
more dense and its radius decreases by 30% by comparison to the no toll (which
is the reference situation).
Our solution approach replaces the optimality condition of the monocentric
city model by a set of two backward differential equations. A standard numerical
approach is then used to efficiently compute the solution. At the empirical stage,
we calibrate the model so that its output matches observations from IDF.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section recalls the monocentric
city model and the solution approach we propose (may be skipped in a first
reading). Section 3 describes the calibration undertaken on Iˆle-de-France and
describes the no toll equilibrium (corresponding to actual situation). In Section
4In the text we make usage of “second toll” to refer to a comparison with the case of one
cordon toll.
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4 we discuss the impact of pricing and focus on the two-cordon scheme. We
conclude in Section 5.
2 Formulation and solution procedure
The analysis is carried out under the classical framework of a monocentric city.
We adopt the formulation of Fujita (1989) and denote the model by HST .
5 All
households are identical and spend their revenue on housing and a composite
good. Their utility level is increasing in the quantities of both goods. The
transport sector claims for land to allocate to roads. Congestion externalities
are taken into account. The radius of the city, the distribution of households on
the residential area and the amount of land devoted to roads are determined at
equilibrium. Without a congestion toll, the city is too large and there are too
many roads. There exists an optimal toll that removes market distortions and
yields a first-best optimum. An efficient equilibrium can be reached with a toll
that endogeinizes external costs.
The number of households living in the city is fixed and equal to N (closed
city). The variable r denotes the distance from the center of the city. Each
household makes daily trips from his location, at distance r from the center of
the city, to the Central Business District (CBD) that extends to distance rc from
the center of the city. Inside the CBD, we assume that transportation is costless.
The radius of the city is denoted by rf . N(r) is the number of households
located further than distance r from the city center. L(r) is the amount of
land available for housing or transportation at r. LT (r) is the amount of land
allocated for transportation at r. Each household consumes two goods, housing
s and a composite good z, and gets a utility U(z, s) where ∂U(z, s)/∂z > 0 and
∂U(z, s)/∂s > 0. All households have the same utility function and the same
(pretax) revenue Y . The price of the composite good is normalized to 1 and the
unitary price of land, or land rent, at distance r from the city center is R(r).
The opportunity cost of land, or the agricultural rent, is denoted by RA.
The amount of composite good necessary to achieve utility level u when
housing area is s is Z(s, u) and corresponds to the solution of (z, s) = u in z.
Let I denote the revenue net of taxes. The household bid rent function ψ(I, u)
is given by
ψ(I, u) := max
s≥0
I − Z(s, u)
s
, (1)
where the maximum is reached at the bid-max lot size S(I, u)
S(I, u) := argmax
s≥0
I − Z(s, u)
s
. (2)
The quantity φ(R, u) is the aftertax revenue required by a household having
utility level u and willing to pay a land rentR. The government is responsible for
5Fujita (1989) refers to the model as the Herbert-Stevens model with traffic congestion.
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providing transportation infrastructure, LT (r), and has the possibility to levy
two kinds of taxes: a population tax that does not depend on r and is denoted
by g, and a location (or congestion) tax that depends on r and is denoted by
l(r).
The road occupancy at r is defined by the ratio of the number N(r) of
households located further away than r from the city center to the amount
LT (r) of land devoted to transport use at r. At each distance r, the transport
cost depends on the road occupancy at r: c(N(r)/LT (r)), where the function
c is assumed to satisfy c(w) > 0, c′(w) > 0 and c′′(w) > 0 for all w ≥ 0. The
transport cost from distance r to the CBD is
τ(r) =
∫ r
rc
c
(
N(r)
LT (r)
)
dx. (3)
Define the bid rent ψT of the transport sector at each distance r as the
marginal benefit of land for transportation at r:
ψT
(
N(r)
LT (r)
)
= −∂c(N(r)/LT (r))∂LT (r) N(r). (4)
The bid rent of the transport sector ψT (N(r)/LT (r)) represents the cumulated
gain for the N(r) commuters from a unit increase of roads at r.
Since all households are identical, it is convenient to assume that they all
reach the same utility level at an optimal solution. The objective of the central
planner is to maximize the total surplus in the city. Let n(r) denotes the number
of households in an annulus of unit width at r. The objective function to be
maximized over (nonnegative) variables n(r), s(r), LT (r) and rf is the following
total surplus S :
S =
∫ rf
rc
{[Y − τ(r) − Z(s(r), u)−RAs(r)]n(r) −RALT (r)}dr. (5)
Any distribution n(r) of households should satisfy the following constraints.
First, the total amount of land devoted to housing and transportation must be
lower or equal than the amount of land available:
n(r)s(r) + LT (r) ≤ L(r) for rc ≤ r ≤ rf . (6)
Second, the distribution of households satisfies:
N(r) =
∫ rf
r
n(r)dr for rc ≤ r ≤ rf . (7)
Finally, all households locate inside the city:
N = N(rc) =
∫ rf
rc
n(r)dr. (8)
The bid-rent function ψ(I, u) is continuously increasing in I, so we can define
φ(R, u) by
φ(R, u) := I ⇔ ψ(I, u) = R. (9)
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Each household chooses r, z and s in order to maximize utility U(z, s) under
revenue constraint z + R(r)s = Y − g − l(r) − τ(r), where τ(r) denotes the
transport cost incurred at r. If we replace I in (1) by6 Y − g − l(r) − τ(r), we
obtain the household bid rent at distance r
ψ(Y − g − l(r)− τ(r), u) = max
s
Y − g − l(r)− τ(r) − Z(s, u)
s
, (10)
and the corresponding bid-max lot size S(Y − g − l(r)− τ(r), u).
In order to compare the optimal pricing rule with alternative policies, we
introduce multiple pricing rules using the function (see DDKP for the details)
H(r) =


c′(Ψ−1T (R(r)))Ψ
−1
T (R(r)) (first-best)
κ (no toll)
ξr1 δ{r1}(r) + ξr2 δ{r2}(r) (cordon toll),
(11)
where κ and ξr1 (and ξr2) are positive constants and δ{rd}(r) is a function that
takes value 1 at distance rd from the city center and zero elsewhere. Under
the no-toll regime users pay only the vehicle operating cost for the trip. Below,
we use the value κ = 0.0414/m/year which is suggested in DDKP. The third
pricing rule in (11) reflects one and two-cordon pricing schemes. When there
are two cordons, both r1 and r2 in (11) are positive and reflect the locations
of the respective cordons. With one cordon, r1 is fixed to the corresponding
location of the cordon and r2 = 0.
Let u > 0 be a fixed utility level. The solution of the problem that consists
in maximizing (5) subject to constraints (6), (7) and (8) can be computed in
the following way (see DDKP). Solve, for all positive rf and for rc ≤ r ≤ rf ,
the system of backward differential equations :

R′(r) = −
H(r) + c(Ψ−1T (R(r)))
∂φ
∂R
(R(r), u)
N ′(r) =
N(r)
Ψ−1
T
(R(r))
− L(r)
S(φ(R(r), u), u)
,
(12)
with terminal conditions R(rf ) = RA and N(rf ) = 0. Then, find rf such
that N(rc) = N . From these, we compute LT (r) = N(r)/Ψ
−1
T (R(r)), s(r) =
S(φ(R(r), u)), and l(r) =
∫ r
rc
c′(Ψ−1T (R(r
′)))Ψ−1T (R(r
′))dr′ for rc ≤ r ≤ rf .
3 Calibration
In this section we calibrate the model parameters to match some target variables
related to IDF region. The monocentric city model may be criticized as unre-
alistic. Indeed, many metropolitan regions have a polycentric structure. This
6Indeed, Y − g− l(r)− τ(r) is the part of the income that remains for the consumption of
housing (s) and the homogeneous good (z).
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has led some authors to suggest that the main effort should focus on polycentric
models instead (cf. Mieszkowski & Mills 1993, for example). The monocentric
framework, however, remains very useful for three reasons, at least. First, for
the case of IDF, as we discuss below, there is a high concentration of (non-
industrial) activities in the CBD located inside Paris. Second, the monocentric
city model is useful when we consider only a part of the economic activity and
the related transportation. In particular, in IDF, most economic activities with
highly skilled employees are concentrated in the CBD. Third, given that the the-
ory underlying the monocentric city model is much more coherent and complete
(many theoretical insights have been already gained), the empirical exercise can
be evaluated much more accurately than if polycentric models were used. We
do not intend to say that the monocentric city model is superior to polycentric
models, but we argue that there are many lessons we can draw from it if we
remain aware of its limitations.
Moreover, empirical observations still confirm the high concentration of eco-
nomic activities in small areas. For the case of IDF, a recent report by Pottier
et al. (2007) states that more than three million households (among a total of five
million) are working in the twenty districts inside Paris. The ratio is even higher
for highly skilled employees, who generally use private cars relatively frequently.
Moreover, maps from AIRPARIF show a high concentration of emissions in the
CBD and the region around. Road transportation account for 27% of (green-
house gas) emissions. On the basis of these observations, we think that many
attributes of IDF can be explored within the monocentric framework. In the
remaining of this section we fit the above model with data from IDF.
Land available
We assume
L(r) = µ(r) × 2pir , (13)
where µ(r) is the fraction of land devoted to housing and transportation at r.
Data from IDF show that the ratio of land used for housing and transportation
by the total land available decreases as we move away from the CBD. Further-
more, collective houses are more concentrated near the CBD and individual
houses spread away from the city center. Collective houses are generally built
on more than four levels, while individual houses are built on one or two levels.
We take into account these facts and approximate µ(r) by an exponential
expression, which yields
µ(r) = 3.191 e−8.7×10
−5r (R2 = 0.99). (14)
As we move away from the CBD the fraction of land available for housing and
transportation decreases substantially.
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Travel speed
There are two options at least on how to compute free-flow travel speed: v0.
First, one may consider that it is constant over all the region. In this case it
can be computed as the (harmonic) mean of the maximum allowed speeds over
the network of three kinds of roads. On the basis of the network of IDF we get
a value of about 55 km/h.
A better approach is to consider that the free-flow travel speed decreases
as we get closer to the CBD. This is because a driver inside Paris uses mainly
(slow) local roads, but can drive on faster roads in outer regions. To take into
account the fact that the free-flow travel speed increases as we move away from
the CBD, we approximate it as follows. At the city border a traveller mainly
uses highways where the speed limit is 110 km/h. A household will be likely to
use highways less as we get closer to the CBD. We assume7 that to travel from
the city center to the CBD, on average, 80% of the trip is made on highways,
and 20% on main roads. A trip that starts closer to the CBD uses less highways
but the same fraction of main roads. Instead, urban area roads (with speed limit
of 50 km/h) substitute for highways. Denoting by wh and wn the respective
fractions of usage of highways and main roads, the average speed is the harmonic
mean(
wh
110
+
wn
70
+
1− wh − wn
50
)
=
1
v0
,
or v0 = 3 850/(77− 42wh − 22wn). As we have mentioned above wn is fixed at
20%. Assuming a linear form of wh and taking into account that wh = .8 at rf
and wh = 0 at rc, we end up with the following relation between the free-flow
travel speed and the distance to the city center:
v0 =
51 931
1− 5.92× 10−6r
.
So, the free-flow travel speed decreases from about 90km/h at distance 70km
(entrance of the city) from the city center to 52km/h at distance 10km (where
the maximum speed generally becomes small). This is more realistic and leads
to better calibration than the fixed v0.
Households
We consider a population of drivers going to and from the city center 230 days
a year,8 and estimate costs over one year. The number of households used is
adjusted so that it corresponds to the number of vehicles used for home-to-
work trips. Since we consider a CBD of radius 3.5 km, and since we consider
only households that make trips to the CBD, we remove half of the population
located in the ring that extends from 0 to 7 kilometers. Accordingly, we consider
a total population of N = 2 120 493 households.
7Based on the authors judgement from a Google-Earth exploration.
8This is approximately: 5 days x 52 weeks - 30 days (holidays).
8
Utility function
Households preferences is represented by a Cobb-Douglas utility function
U(z, s) = zαsβ , (15)
with α, β > 0. From the Cobb-Douglas utility functions properties, we know
that the ratio β/α is equal to the share of the available revenue spent on housing
with respect to the share spent on the homogeneous good. Robson (1976)
assumed a value of 50% and Kanemoto (1977) has reduced the approximation to
what seems to be a more realistic 20%. In the base-case, we consider the second
value which matches recent estimation by INSEE.9 Thus, we have α = 4β, so
that
U(z, s) =
(
z4s
)β
. (16)
An alternative value of β is considered for the sake of comparison.
Congestion term
We consider a BPR congestion function of the form
c(γ(r)) =
θ
v0
(1 + kγ(r)λ), (17)
where k and λ are given constants, v0 the free-flow travel speed, θ the house-
holds’ valuation of time and γ(r) = N(r)/LT (r). The value of time in IDF
was estimated in 2001 to 11.6e/h for home-to-work trips (Source: Boiteux
(2001)).10 To take into account the increase since 2001, we take the value
of 15e/h (which corresponds to a five year growth rate at 5%). So, during
a year with 230 working days and an average of two trips per day, we have
θ = 15 × 230 × 2 (eh−1year−1). To obtain a convex congestion cost function
in (17), we selected λ > 1 and positive k. Both parameters are used in the
calibration of the model.
Tolling schemes
We consider four policies:11
1. no toll (NT), where κ = 0.0414 in (11) reflects the vehicle operating cost;
2. one-cordon toll (CT1), where a driver pays a toll when he enters inside
the cordon region;
9See INSEE (2003).
10For the sake of comparison, the average value of time for work trips reported in Small &
Verhoef (2007), Chapter 3, is $9.14/h for metropolitan areas in the US in 2003.
11In some sense, these policies discriminate between households on the basis of their location.
This remains, however, different from the usual price discrimination discussed in Anderson &
Renault (2005) and Pigou (1932).
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3. two-cordon toll (CT2), where a driver pays a toll each time he enters one
of the two cordon regions;
4. a first-best toll (FB) that internalizes the external costs.
NT may be interpreted as a small tax or, better, the vehicle operating cost per
kilometer. On the basis of gasoline price of 1.5e per liter, the gasoline cost
per meter for an average vehicle that consumes 6 liters per 100 kilometer is
0.0207e per meter per year. Assuming that gasoline price is half the vehicle
operating cost we use κ = 0.0414 for the NT policy.12 For the cordon tolls,
both the location and the value are chosen to maximize the surplus given (5).
In practice, the optimization process (in particular, with CT2) is a tedious but
a straightforward task. Pricing rule NT is the reference policy, since it is closer
to the real situation.
Calibration procedure
A dataset related to rings with 7km intervals is used to feed the model with data.
To replicate the urban structure of IDF, we construct a loss function (denoted
“Loss”) that depends on the four parameters u, β, k and λ. The loss function
is equal to the weighted sum of square errors between observed data and the
output of the model. We focus on the radius of the city (rf ), the distribution of
the households (pop), the travel time (tt) and the level of the urban rent (rent).
The expression of the loss function is
Loss(u, β, k, λ) =
∑
r∈7,14,...,70
{wrf
(
Mrf − rf
rf
)2
+ wrent
(
M rrent − R(r)
R(r)
)2
+
wtt
(
M rtt − tt(r)
tt(r)
)2
+ wpop
(
M rpop − pop(r)
pop(r)
)2
}, (18)
where wx denotes the weight of variable x, M
r
x denotes the value of x predicted
by the model at r (r measured in km). The four variables are not measured
in the same way : “rent” is the average rent between r and r − ∆r (we have
used ∆r = 7km), “tt” is the average travel time for households between r and
r−∆r, “pop” is the number of households between r and r−∆r. The weights
are set equal (and normalized to one) by default. They may be changed to
focus the calibration on a given set of variables. By construction, the function
Loss(u, β, k, λ) reaches a unique minimum when observed values match the
output of the model.
The model is calibrated with respect to policy NT, i.e. when each driver
pays a tax that reflects the vehicle operating cost. The output of the model
with parameter values u = 11 976, β = 0.2, λ = 4.02 and k = 6.6 × 10−12 fits
particularly well the distribution of households and travel time. Figure 1 shows
12Based on authors’ judgement and data in INSEE (2005)
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Figure 1: Distribution of households:
observed and predicted (R2 = 0.987).
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Figure 2: Travel time: observed and
predicted (R2 = 0.97).
the observed distribution of households in IDF and the distribution produced
by the model. The correlation is satisfactory. Figure 2 shows observed and
predicted values for the travel time. The correlation between the two sets is
high, even if the slope of the predicted values seems higher. The variable free-
flow travel speed has been useful to refine the approximation of the travel time.
The only variable that does not seem to be well fitted by the model is the land
rent. This fact may be explained intuitively as follows. Under the monocentric
city framework, the market rent is an exclusive result of transport costs. The
attractiveness of the CBD lies in the fact that we incur lower travel time. But,
in reality the attractiveness of the CBD of Paris is the result of many other
attributes: a richer social life, better access to many facilities, and so on. This
is one of the limitations of the model used here.
4 Results
The no toll situation (NT), where road users face the vehicle operating cost
only, is taken as the reference situation. We consider three alternative pricing
rules: (1) one-cordon toll, (2) two-cordon toll, and (3) first-best toll. A cordon
toll requires the specification of a location as well as a value of the toll. We use
a grid search to find both values that maximize the social surplus. With two
cordons, two locations and two values are required. Again, we perform a grid
search to find those values that yield highest social surplus. The computation
of the optimal values with four arguments is time consuming. The first-best toll
endogenizes the external costs and yields the optimal form of the city.
Simulation output are summarized in Table 1. The first column of Table
1 provides location tax corresponding to H(r) in (11). The second column
contains the radius of the city rf . Column s corresponds to the average area
occupied by a household (s =
∫ rf
rc
s(r) n(r)dr/N ). The average (one-way)
vehicle-kilometers is given in column V K and we have V K =
∫ rf
rc
r n(r)dr/N .
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tx rf s V K RD TT CL CT ∆S
Total City Hous. Trip Roads’ Trav. Land Trsp. Surp.
tax radius area len. surf. time cost cost varia.
e/y km m2 km 104m2 mins e/y e/y e/y
NT 769 73.42 84.24 22.08 7 539 37.7 5 750 3 469 0
CT1 2 410 55.63 84.89 19.63 6 482 33.9 5 542 3 130 181
CT2 3 541 50.85 83.64 19.13 6 237 33.2 5 426 3 072 210
FB 7 172 48.65 83.13 18.71 6 049 32.7 5 360 3 021 286
NT: no toll; CT1: one-cordon toll; CT2: two-cordon toll; FB: first-best toll
One cordon (22km, 22.5e/day) Two cordons (31km, 16e/day):(14km, 13e/day)
Table 1: Impacts of road pricing under the four regimes.
Column RD indicates how much land is allocated to roads. TT denotes the
average travel time for a trip. Column CL reflects the opportunity cost of land
per household per year. The generalized transport cost per year for and average
household is given in column CT . The last column, column ∆S , contains the
average impact of pricing on the surplus per household per year. The social
surplus is computed as the amount of money that is not spent by households
(given they reach the target utility level u). So, an increase in the surplus
indicates that households remain at the same utility level but have larger part
of their revenues unspent. An efficient city structure leads to an increase in the
social surplus.
Under the FB regime, the radius of the city is reduced by 34% by comparison
to the unpriced situation. The travel distance is reduced by 15%, while the
average travel time drops from 38 to 33 mins (by 13%). So, congestion pricing
has positive impact on the social welfare but also on the level of emissions.
Assuming that CO2 emissions are proportional to travel distance, an appreciable
positive impact on pollution is indirectly obtained. FB toll leads to high increase
of the land rent for the areas close to the CBD. As shown by Figure 4, the
population becomes particularly dense around the CBD. Indeed, road pricing
has two main impacts on the form of the city. First, it reduces urban sprawl
and leaves more land available for alternative usage (agriculture). Second, it
motivates households to locate near the CBD. The distribution of households is
re-shaped with a high density near the CBD. Most pricing policies are effective
in reducing the size of the city but fail to adequately motivate households to
locate optimally. This may be a further argument favoring road pricing against
urban boundary as a tool to combat urban sprawl (cf. Brueckner 2000, Pines &
Sadka 1985).
With one-cordon the optimal location is at 21km from the city center and
the optimal toll is about 22e per household per day. An optimal one-cordon toll
is 63% as efficient as the first-best toll, where efficiency is based on the increase
in social surplus. The radius of the city is reduced to 57km and the average
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travel distance decreases from 22.075 to 19.720km. The land rent remains flat,
but the jump at the cordon location (cf. Figure 3) induces a higher rents inside
cordon area. Table 1 shows that the gain in surplus comes from savings in the
opportunity cost of land and in travel cost. Under the compact city, congestion
decreases and the average travel for a trip drops from 38 to 34 mins (11%). From
column RD in Table 1, the amount of land allocated to roads decreases by 13%
by comparison to NT. Indeed, unpriced congestion leads to over-investment in
roads and leaves less land for housing usage.
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Figure 3: Land rent.
Intuitively, the two-cordon pricing would be more effective than one-cordon.13
Indeed, the two locations may be chosen so as to act separately on the radius
of the city (the first cordon) and on getting more households close to the CBD
(the second cordon). Optimal locations are found to be at 31km and 14km from
the city center, respectively. The toll levels are 16e and 13e, respectively for
the first and second cordons, which are located respectively at 31km and 14km.
By comparison to first-best, two-cordon toll yields a 73% of the optimal sur-
plus. So, the second cordon yields a marginal efficiency of 10%. The radius of
the city decreases to 50km and the average travel distance becomes 19.128km.
In this sense, the second toll decreases CO2 emissions slightly (by 3%). The
land rent remains flat by comparison with the curve obtained under first-best,
13In practice, the welfare impacts of each tolling policy will depend on how toll revenues
are spent and/or redistributed. De Palma et al. (2007) discusses a number of issues in this
sense.
13
but the upwards jumps increase the price levels particularly in the area inside
the second cordon. As shown by Figure 4, there is a higher concentration of
households around the CBD. The surface of land allocated to roads decreases by
17%, which is close to the 20% decrease reached under FB. As a consequence,
even if the city gets smaller, the average housing area occupied by each house-
hold does not decrease too much under CT2 and FB. This area even increases
under CT1. Indeed, the decrease in the radius of the city induces a relatively
smaller decrease in the available land (from the expression in (13)). At the same
time, roads decrease at all distances from the city center. Overall, the resulting
variation in the housing area remains almost the same.
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Figure 4: Distribution of the population.
In practice, the first-best toll has always been criticized as being complicate
to devise. Alternative, simpler and more acceptable tolling rules have been
proposed to replace first-best toll. Linear tolls (discussed in DDKP) may be
implemented as a tax on gasoline. But, increasing further the gasoline price may
face opposition from road users. Cordon tolls have the convenience to depend
on the trip characteristics (origin and destination), and by so offer an interesting
alternative to collect revenues, limit the level of emissions and congestion as well
as yielding an acceptable gain in surplus.
The last point we discuss is the users’ opposition to road pricing. In general,
users perceive the toll as an additional tax and not as a regulation instrument.
The introduction of the toll is likely to be rejected by those who are located out-
side the cordon region. With an inelastic demand, users inside the cordon region
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Figure 5: Voting for two cordons.
are indifferent since they do not pay the toll. Overall, there is an opposition
towards the introduction of the toll.
Suppose now that the first cordon is already in place and the government
wishes to introduce a second toll. Some users will be opposed but others will
support the second cordon toll because they pay less under the new policy.
Figure 5 shows the toll levels (with one and two cordons) as a function of the
household’s location. The continuous line corresponds to the toll level with two
cordons and the discontinuous line corresponds to the toll level with one cordon.
The numbers in percentage indicate the proportion of households living in the
given location. The impact of the second toll, whether positive or negative, is
indicated whenever it is not zero.
The second toll is rejected by households living between 14 and 22km and
those located beyond 31km. So, 46% of the population is likely to vote against
this second toll. At the same time households located between 22 and 31km will
pay a lower toll and will support the introduction of the toll. In our case this
second group contains only 16% and does not represent a majority. Households
living inside the radius of 14km (37% of the population) are indifferent to the
introduction of the cordon. Notice that the first cordon would have been rejected
by 32% (=16%+16%) of the population. The opposition to the second cordon,
which is about 30% (=46%−16%), is quite similar. These observations show
that a second cordon has a smaller marginal benefit than the first cordon but
is almost as unpopular. This fact may explain that most real experiences have
been limited to one cordon toll.
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5 Conclusion
This paper quantified the impact of a second cordon toll on the urban structure
of Iˆle-de-France. The intuition supporting this policy is to let a first cordon toll
reduce the radius of the city and let a second concentrate households around the
CBD. Indeed, these two features characterize the optimal toll which is relatively
difficult to implement in reality (cf. Figure 4).
With one cordon toll the radius of the city is reduced by 23% by comparison
to the no-toll situation. With the second toll we get a decrease of 30%. Social
surplus (the objective function) increases from 63% to 73% with the second
cordon. The impact of the second cordon is less important on congestion and
travel distance, where a decrease of about 3% is obtained in both cases. A dense
city is characterized by higher energy efficiency, lower levels of emissions and
lower investment on roads. Given the difficulties to implement first-best tolls
and the difficulty to further increase the gasoline price, cordon tolls turn out
to be a useful tool to efficiently allocate land and reduce emissions for large
metropolitan areas (like Iˆle-de-France).
The algorithm presented to solve the HST model is flexible and extends
to various pricing schemes, including cordon tolls. The computation of the
equilibrium toll is typically a challenging task and a number of authors have
used specific algorithms for this purpose. For example, Sumalee et al. (2005) uses
a genetic algorithm optimization process to compute the optimal values of the
toll. De Palma et al. (2005) and Zhang & Yang (2004) conduct an analysis based
on simplified graph structures. Ho et al. (2005) use a particular formulation and
compute optimal locations of multiple cordons. The numerical approach of finite
element method used to approximate the solution is innovating in that it allows
the treatment of two dimensional problem.14 These papers, however, focus on
the short-term impacts and do not consider the re-localization of households (on
the long term) given the change in the travel cost introduced by road pricing.
The focus of this paper is the long run impact.
As it is usually the case in the monocentric city model, we have assumed
that the toll is collected in the social surplus as a lump sum. There is a number
of interesting alternatives one may propose for a better usage of toll revenues
(cf. De Palma et al. 2007). For example, it could be better to invest in the
public transport. In this case, each household will choose either to make the
daily trip using his car or using public transport, or by commuting between the
two modes. The households decision, and by so the welfare impact, will depend
on how the public infrastructure is introduced in the model. A second option,
mainly concerned by CO2 emissions, is to use toll revenues to provide incentives
to vehicle producers and drivers to switch to cleaner technologies.
On a basis of a voting scheme, the implementation of a second toll is likely
to face as much opposition as the implementation of the first cordon. From
14In the standard monocentric city model, all quantities depend on the distance from the
city center, so the problem is one dimensional. This assumes that the city (with the housing
and transportation land) has a regular shape (generally, a circular form). When the urban
shape of the city is not so symmetric the problem is no longer one dimensional.
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another perspective, when acceptability is based on the value of the toll,15 then
the two-cordon scheme may be more attractive to most users than the one-
cordon scheme. Indeed, with a two-cordon toll, most users (83%) pay only
13e or less and only 16% pay high toll of 29e. With one cordon, 32% of the
users pay 22e. Moreover, a parallel computations we have conducted show
that the efficiency level of a one-cordon scheme can be reached by a two-cordon
scheme, but with a 30% discount in the values of the two tolls. Under this latter
policy, only 30% of drivers, those living between 14km and 22km from the city
center, are worse off with the two-cordon by comparison to the one-cordon. The
moderate level of the toll paid by most households may be an argument favoring
the introduction of a second toll.
Finally, we’d like to highlight the parallel between the multi-cordon toll prob-
lem and multi-step tolls proposed as a simple alternative to the fine toll. They
both amount to a finite approximation of an optimal toll, where the approxima-
tion is motivated by simple implementation issues. Arnott et al. (1990) discusses
the case of a one fixed step and Laih (1994) extends the analysis towards two
and three steps assuming a linear travel cost function. Laih concludes that an
n-step toll is n/(n + 1) as efficient as the fine toll. So, from one to a two-step
toll efficiency increases by 16.67% (from 50 to 66.67%). This variation is higher,
but remains comparable, to the induced gain of 10% obtained by the second
cordon toll in our analysis.
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